Talks/Presentations

Upcoming

‘Aspects of the Theory of Visual Syntax’ (May, 2022), Formats of Vision and Thought Conference, Gladstone Hotel, Toronto

‘Seeing Numbers’ (w/ Jake Beck, and comments from Stella Lourenco) (May 2022), Keynote at PhiVis, a philosophy of perception satellite meeting at VSS.

Symposium on the number sense (w/ Richard Samuels, Jake Beck, Stella Lourenco, Yunji Park, Eric Snyder, & Stewart Shapiro) (July 2022) at SPP/ESPP in Milan

Past

Talk on the Number Sense for the History and Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic Seminar (HPML) in Southern California (21 January 2022)

Symposium on the Number Sense (w/ Jacob Beck, and commentaries from Oliver Marshal and Geoffrey Lee) (18 January 2022), Eastern APA, Baltimore

‘The Number Sense Represents Numbers’ (1 July, 2021) The Society for Philosophy and Psychology

‘On the equidistance between natural numbers: commentary on Quinon (2021)’ (30 April, 2021) Bogazici University

‘The Number Sense Represents Numbers’ (22/23 April, 2021), Foundations of Animal Minds Conference, Johns Hopkins University (via Zoom)

‘The Number Sense Represents (Rational) Numbers’ (20 April, 2021), The Senior Seminar, University of Glasgow

‘Mapping the Visual Icon’ (16 April, 2021), Colloquium, École Normale Supérieure/Institut Jean Nicod (via Zoom)

‘What Numbers Does the Number Sense Represent?’ (7 April, 2021), Hopkins Perception & Mind Lab (via Zoom)

‘The Number Sense Represents (Rational) Numbers’ (8 March, 2021), University of Sheffield (via Zoom)

‘The Number Sense Represents (Rational) Numbers’ (8 March, 2021), University of Sheffield (via Zoom)

‘The Number Sense Represents (Rational) Numbers’ (29 January, 2021), GTA Animal Cognition Group (with Jake Beck, via Zoom)

‘The Number Sense Represents (Rational) Numbers’ (7 October, 2020), Brown University’s Perception Seminar (via Zoom)

‘Does the Number Sense Represent Number?’ (29 July, 2020), Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society (via Zoom; video presentation)

‘Joint Event Codes’ (4 June, 2020), CEU SOMBY Lab (via Zoom)

‘Pain is Modular’ (21 May, 2020), Oxford Mind WiP Seminar (via Zoom)

‘Mapping the Visual Icon’ (28th February, 2020), Weekly Colloquium, University of Miami, Florida.

‘On a confusion about the modularity of perception’ (20th February, 2020), VISTA Retreat, Aviva Centre, York University, Toronto.

‘Does the Number Sense Represents Number?’ (7th February, 2020), Language & Development Lab, UCSD, California.

‘Is Vision Iconic?’ (7th November, 2019), MindWork Seminar, University of Texas at Austin.

‘Cognitive Penetration and Informational Encapsulation: Have we been failing the module?’ (6th September, 2019), European Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Athens, Greece.

‘Cognitive Penetration and Informational Encapsulation: Have we been failing the module?’ (May, 2019), Glasgow Graduate Conference on Epistemology and Mind, University of Glasgow, UK (with a response by Fiona Macpherson) – winner of the CSPE Graduate Bursary for the top ranked submission on the philosophy of perception.

‘Beyond the Icon: On Carey’s Characterisation of Core Cognition’ (June, 2018), Canadian Association of Philosophy’s Annual Meeting, Université du Québec, Montreal (with a response by Dan Casey).

‘Beyond the Icon: On Carey’s Characterisation of Core Cognition’ (7 May, 2018), Toronto Philosophy Graduate Conference, University of Toronto, Toronto (with a response by Mason Westfall).

‘Representational Format and the Bounds of Perception’ (7 April, 2018), Cognition Conference, Catholic University of America, Washington DC.

‘Representational Formats in Perception and Development’ (29 March, 2018), Princeton Baby Lab, Princeton Neuroscience Institute, Princeton.

‘Beyond the Icon’ (27 March, 2018), The Philosophy Society, Princeton University, Princeton.

‘Beyond the Icon: On Carey’s Characterisation of Core Cognition’ (15 March, 2018), Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, San Antonio (presented, and responded to, by Justin Fisher).

‘Icons, Schmicons and Core Cognition’ (3 November, 2017), Thought and Sense Conference, University of Oslo, Oslo.

‘The (Un)limits of Iconicity’ (22 September, 2017), NYC Philosophy of Mind/Psychology Workshop, CUNY Graduate Centre, New York City.

‘Five Obstacles to Core Cognition of Goals’ (17 May, 2017), Action Mini-Workshop (invited as part of John Michael’s Sense of Commitment Project), University of Warwick, Coventry.

‘Don’t Fail the Module!’ (3 December, 2016), Mindgrad, University of Warwick, Coventry (with a response by Stephen Butterfill).

‘Don’t Fail the Module!’ (22 November, 2016), Neurophilosophy Lunchtime Seminar, University of Milan, Milan.

‘Don’t Fail the Module!’ (19 October, 2016), Ockham Society, University of Oxford, Oxford.

‘Seeing Sally’s Sadness’ (18 October, 2016), AHRC Welcome Day, University of Oxford, Oxford.

‘Goal Ascription for the A-rational’ (19-23 September, 2016), Minds Online, The Brains Blog (with commentaries by Kristin Andrews, Mitchell Herschbach and Joulia Smortchkova).

‘Modularity as a Natural Kind’ (2 September, 2016), The Second London Philosophy of Science Graduate Conference, University College London, London.

‘Do Humans Make Thoughtless Goal Ascriptions?’ (8 April, 2016), York Graduate Conference: Social Cognition and Memory, York University, Toronto (with a response by Robin Jenkins).

‘Seeing Sally’s Sadness’ (4 December, 2015), Open Minds XI, University of Manchester, Manchester.

‘Molyneux’s Question and Cognitive Science’ (15 May, 2015), BPPA workshop on sense and space, University College London, London.

Reply to Anna Ciaunica-Garrouty’s ‘Basic Forms of Pre-reflective Self-Consciousness’ with Stephen Butterfill, (3 December, 2014) Mindgrad, University of Warwick, Coventry.

‘Can Molyneux’s Question be settled empirically?’ (15 October, 2014), iCog: Perspectives on Learning, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh.

‘Can Humans Visually Experience Forthcoming Goal Outcomes?’ (18 September, 2014), European Society for Philosophy and Psychology, 22nd Annual Meeting, Noto, Sicily.

‘Molyneux’s Question’ (March, 2014), Open Day, University of Warwick, Coventry.

‘It is not possible to improve the strength of a subject’s epistemic position with respect to a sceptical hypothesis using a ‘Moorean’ inference’ (February, 2014), Graduate W.I.P seminar, University of Warwick, Coventry.

‘Molyneux’s Question as an empirical experiment’ (1 February, 2014), University of Warwick Philosophy and Psychology Weekend, Cumberland Lodge, Windsor, UK.

‘10month old infants’ show sensitivity to statistical probabilities in active learning paradigms’ (August, 2013), Psychology W.I.P seminar, UC Berkeley, Berkeley.